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Gaps in the interpretation of pronouns*
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Abstract Donkey sentences receive either existential or universal truth-conditions.
This paper presents two new data points going against standard dynamic approaches
to this ambiguity: first, I show that the ambiguity extends beyond quantified en-
vironments, to cross-clausal anaphora. Second, I show that donkey sentences can
give rise to narrow pseudo-scope readings, where the pronoun’s implicit quantifi-
cation takes scope below some operator in the sentence. Neither of these facts is
predicted by standard dynamic accounts. Together, they suggest a different analysis
in which the ambiguity arises when the pronoun has multiple referents to pick from.
Inspired by Champollion, Bumford & Henderson (2017), I propose that when such
circumstances arise, the pronoun receives vague reference. Using standard rules of
projection is then sufficient to derive the existential/universal ambiguity as well as
the two problematic data points.
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1 Introduction
Three problems. The sentences in (1-2) raise a number of problems for theories
of pronoun interpretation. The first problem is to explain how an indefinite and a
pronoun may co-vary, when the latter is not in the scope of the former. Two particular
cases are often discussed: donkey sentences (Geach 1964), such as (1), where the
indefinite and the pronoun are split between the restrictor and the nuclear scope of a
quantifier, and cross-clausal anaphora (2) where the indefinite and the pronoun are
in different but conjoined clauses.
(1) a. Every farmer who owns a donkey treats it gently.
b. No student who wrote a thesis on algebra was satisfied with it.
c. Some adventurer who found a dinosaur bone donated it to the museum.
(2) a. Camelia has a donkey and she cherishes it.
* For valuable feedback and discussion, I thank Gennaro Chierchia, Lucas Champollion, Michel
DeGraff, Edward Flemming, Danny Fox, Martin Hackl, Irene Heim, Roger Schwarzschild, and the
students of the MIT Workshop of Fall 2017 and anonymous SALT reviewers. Special thanks to Lucas
Champollion for extensive discussion of both form and content.
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b. Camelia has a donkey and she cherishes it.
c. If Camelia adopts a donkey and she cherishes it, she will feel bliss.
The second problem raised by such sentences is determining what truth conditions
they receive. For instance, it is known that sentences containing every may receive
two different sets of truth conditions: the universal reading and the existential
reading. This is shown in (3) and (4).
(3) Every farmer who owns a donkey treats it gently. UNIVERSAL
! every donkey-owning farmer treats all of his donkeys gently.
(4) Every person who had a hat wore it at the party. EXISTENTIAL
! every hat-owning person wore one of his hats.
The final challenge raised by these sentences is to understand what pragmatic factors
affect the availability of the different readings. Some generalizations seem to hold
(see Kanazawa 1994 for discussion, and Foppolo 2008 for experimental evidence):
for instance, it seems that quantifiers come with a preferred reading: universal for
“every”, existential for “some” and “no”.
Goal. In this paper, I intend to tackle the second challenge, namely that of figuring
what the underlying truth-conditions of the sentences in (1) and (2) are. Particularly
relevant to this paper is the existence and form of the existential/universal ambiguity.
I will first make a negative contribution, by providing evidence that accounts that
rely on the interpretation of dynamic conjunction to obtain the existential/universal
ambiguity discussed above face two under-generation issues: first, they fail to predict
cases of narrow pseudo-scope readings (as I will refer to them), where the quantifica-
tional force associated with the pronoun seems to be able to take scope beneath other
operators in the sentence; second, I will show that the existential/universal ambiguity
in fact extends beyond donkey sentences, and can be replicated with cross-clausal
anaphoras as in (2), despite initial evidence to the contrary and previous literature.
If these arguments are successful, they put in question the usefulness of common
dynamic denotations for conjunction.
Taken together, these two under-generation issues seem to point in the same
direction: they suggest that the existential/universal ambiguity originates from the
pronoun. I will accept this fact and propose the following explanation to it: pronouns
that have multiple referential targets, as do pronouns anteceded by indefinites with
more than one witness, have vague reference. The treatment of vagueness is the
trivalent semantics offered in Champollion et al. 2017, supplemented with a projec-
tion rule. The resulting theory will correctly predict existential/universal ambiguity
across the board and narrow pseudo-scope readings.
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This theory comes with two caveats: first, it needs to be supplemented with a
theory of vagueness resolution. The procedure in Champollion et al. 2017 is readily
available, but future research will be needed to explain the existence of the preferred
readings discussed before (the third challenge). Second, for simplicity, I will make
commitments as to how a pronoun access its referents and adopt an E-type strategy.
As I will explain, this does not mean that a dynamic version of the theory is out of
question.
Outline. In section 2, I will introduce what I will call the Extension Principle, a
principle enforced by common rules of interpretation for conjunction in Dynamic
Semantics, and show how it is often used to craft quantifiers that derive the existential
and universal readings. In section 3, I will present two under-generation problems,
and show how they derive from the adoption of the extension principle. I will
then proceed to present my own analysis in section 4. I will then discuss previous
approaches to the phenomenon in section 5 and conclude.
2 Extension principle: the interpretation of dynamic conjunctions
Extension principle. Standard dynamic systems are designed to give conjoined
clauses like (5a) the same truth-conditions as a sentence in which the indefinite takes
scope over the conjunction, such as (5b). This principle, stated below, is what I will
refer to as the Extension Principle1.
(5) a. Camelia has a donkey and she cherishes it.
b. There is a donkey that Camelia has and that she cherishes.
Extension Principle
(∃x,A(x))∧B(x)⇔∃x,(A(x)∧B(x))
This principle is not basic; it is often derived from two more primitive ingredients:
non-deterministic updates performed by the indefinite and an adequate rule of
interpretation for conjunction that channels these updates. In the sequel, it will not
be necessary for us to know how those ingredients work in detail2. I will simply take
it for granted that the denotation of conjunction and the indefinite work together to
give rise to this principle.
1 This principle is stated at the meta-language level. This is suitable for dynamic systems which
translate natural language statement into logics such as Dynamic Predicate Logic (Groenendijk &
Stokhof 1991). In dynamic systems where the interpretation function maps the object language
directly onto model-theoretic objects, such as Compositional DRT (Muskens 1996), the Extension
Principle would need a harmless restatement in terms of those model-theoretic objects.
2 See Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991 and Muskens 1996 for a presentation.
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Consequences. By design, as we’ve seen, such a principle predicts the possibil-
ity of cross-conjunction anaphora and furthermore predicts that cross-conjunction
anaphora should get existential readings. But the principle has consequences beyond
cross-conjunction anaphora: readings of donkey sentences of the likes of (6) can
naturally be constructed on the basis of the Extension Principle.
(6) Every farmer who owns a donkey treats it gently.
To do so, one needs to capitalize on the logical equivalence in (7), which holds for
conservative quantifiers. This makes it possible to create the truth-conditionally
equivalent denotation for natural language quantifiers in (8), where the scope of the
quantifier now encompasses both the NP content and the VP content. In the case of
donkey sentences, this results in a conjunction of a clause with an indefinite and a
clause containing a pronoun. By the Extension Principle, we know that the pronoun
in the resulting structure will be interpretable and will be interpreted existentially (cf
(8b), derivation in (8)). In short, this denotation makes existential donkey anaphora
possible.
(7) If Q is a conservative quantifier, Q(restrictor)(scope) is equivalent to
Q(restrictor)(restrictor∧ scope)
(8) Jevery α β K= ∀x ∈ JαK, JαK(x)∧ Jβ K(x)
a. J(6)K= ∀x ∈ Jowns a donkeyK, Jowns a donkeyK(x)∧ Jtreats it gentlyK(x)
= ∀x∈ Jowns a donkeyK, (∃y,owns-donkey′(y)(x))∧Jtreats it gentlyK(x)
=∀x∈ Jowns a donkeyK, ∃y,(owns-donkey′(y)(x)∧treats-gently′(y)(x))
(applying the Extension Principle)
b. J(6)K= true iff for every donkey-owning farmer treats gently some donkey
he owns
This is not the only way to create a donkey-friendly version of quantifiers. The
logical equivalence in (9) provides another way. Again, thanks to the Extension
Principle, it is possible to see that this sentence will be interpretable and that it yields
a universal reading of the pronoun.
(9) If Q is a conservative quantifier, Q(restrictor)(scope) is equivalent to
Q(restrictor)(¬(restrictor∧¬scope))
(10) Jevery α β K= ∀x ∈ JαK, ¬(JαK(x)∧¬Jβ K(x))
a. J(6)K= true iff for every donkey-owning farmer treats gently every donkey
he owns
The conclusion to draw from this discussion is that in dynamic semantics, the analy-
sis of quantified sentences - and thus donkey sentences - follows smoothly from the
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treatment of cross-conjunction anaphora. Moreover, the two recipes for deriving dy-
namic quantifiers coincide with the desired ambiguity between existential/universal
readings3.
There are however good reasons why such an account of the ambiguity has been
abandoned in subsequent dynamic literature. One such reason is the availability
of mixed readings (Brasoveanu 2007), as in (11), where a single quantifier hosts
in its scope both an existentially interpreted pronoun and a universally interpreted
pronoun. Any account that derives the existential/universal ambiguity from a similar
ambiguity in the quantifier’s denotation would fail to make that prediction.
(11) Every gentleman who has a credit card1 and bought a yacht2 used the card1
to pay for the yacht2.
 used a card of his for every yacht he bought.
Be it as it may, alternative dynamic accounts of the ambiguity, which we will review
in section 5, make use of at least one of the two dynamic quantifier denotations
that we discussed, along with other assumptions. As such, they fall victim to the
challenges I now proceed to present.
3 Challenges to the extension principle
Universal readings across clauses. As we saw, the Extension Principle only
generates existential readings for cross-clausal anaphora. This is in line with previous
literature, which only acknowledges the existence of existential readings (as in (12))
to cross-clausal anaphora. My goal is to show that universal readings also exist.
(12) Camelia has a donkey and she cherishes it.
 Camelia has a donkey and she cherishes one of the donkeys she owns.
Before that, let me explain why we a priori expect that such a reading would be
difficult to find. Recall from the introduction that donkey sentences constructed with
quantifiers no and some seem to prefer an existential reading. This is only a prefer-
ence, however; it has been noted (Kanazawa 1994; Chierchia 1995; Geurts 2002)
that certain biasing items - typically those containing some flavour of negation4- can
produce universal truth-conditions, as revealed by the example below.
(13) No gentleman who owns an umbrella left it at home today.
 no umbrella-owning gentleman left all of his umbrellas
3 These two recipes for constructing dynamic quantifiers have been known since at least Rooth 1985,
Root 1986.
4 The verb leave can be construed as the negation of “take” and thus lumped with negative elements.
This step would require a justification; it is not immediate on theoretical grounds that leave should be
the negative pole of the antonym pair take-leave.
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The conclusion to draw from this discussion of donkey sentences is the following:
whenever a donkey sentence has a preferred existential reading, the universal reading
is marginal and is only revealed by biasing items. A natural expectation to have
is the following: if the existential/universal ambiguity does exist in cross-clausal
contexts, it is hard to find and requires careful choice of lexical items.
There is another hurdle in the way of discovering universal readings: uniqueness
implicatures. A unembedded indefinite as in (12) frequently give rise to a uniqueness
implicature (e.g. Camelia owns just one donkey), thus collapsing the difference
between existential and universal readings. In the following tests, I will therefore
use bets (Schlenker 2012) to probe unstengrenthened truth-conditions. (14) shows
that this technique is sufficient to remove uniqueness implicatures.
(14) a. I bet you $10 that Mrs. Jones will buy a car
b. Outcome: Mrs. Jones bought two cars.
 speaker wins
Now consider the bets in (15-16), with biasing items and appropriate contextualizing.
Under the existential reading that the Extension Principle predicts, they should both
be won under the described outcomes, since one can find an umbrella that Camelia
has and that she left, or a black suit that Charles packed and that he is not wearing.
(15) a. Context: Speaker is arguing that Camelia is absent-minded, hearer dis-
agrees.
b. I bet you $10 that Camelia has an umbrella and that she left it at home
today.
c. Outcome: Camelia has 10 umbrellas. She brought one and left the others.
(16) a. Context: Speaker suspects Charles is not following the boat party’s dress-
code, hearer disagrees.
b. I bet you $10 that Charles packed a black suit and that he is not wearing it
right now.
c. Outcome: Charles packed two black suits and was wearing one of them at
the time of the bet.
The reactions I collected for these bets were not unanimous but more importantly,
they were all inconsistent with what the Extension Principle predicts. One population
of speakers thought the bet was categorically lost. Another population agreed with
the loss verdict but pointed out that a combative speaker may want to point out that
the umbrellas that were left or the unworn suits. One speaker thought the bet was
off, for lack of a clear outcome. Finally, only one speaker thought the bet was won.
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To appreciate this variation, it is useful to compare these reactions to the base-
lines obtained by scoping the indefinite above the conjunctions. Here, informants
unanimously grant victory to the speaker. Under the Extension Principle, the two sets
of bets should have the same truth-conditions and this discrepancy is unexpected.
(17) a. I bet you $10 that there is an umbrella that Camelia has and that she left at
home.
b. Outcome: Camelia has 10 umbrellas. She brought one and left the others.
→ won!
(18) a. I bet you $10 that there is a black suit that Charles packed and that he is
not wearing right now.
b. Outcome: Charles packed two black suits and was wearing one of them at
the time of the bet. → won!
In conclusion, we see that when using biasing items, a majority of speakers seem
to be able to access stronger universal truth-conditions. Under the account to be
presented, both this judgment and the variation observed in the range of responses
will find an explanation. Indeed, I will propose that cross-clausal anaphora are
intrinsically vague. This means that the bets studied in (15-16) are vague. Since
different speakers may have different strategies to cope with this vagueness, the
responses are expected to be speaker-dependent.
Narrow pseudo-scope readings. All the paraphrases for the existential/universal
ambiguity I gave so far replace the pronoun by some quantified expression, either
existential or universal. Let’s refer to this quantifier as the implicit quantifier. Its
scope will be called the pseudo-scope of the pronoun, following Brasoveanu 20075.
An interesting property of the Extension Principle is that it only generates
wide pseudo-scope readings. To see that, imagine a sentence like (19a), where
OP is some operator capable of displaying scope interactions. By the Extension
Principle, this sentence is to be interpreted as in (19b). In this reading, the pronoun’s
implicit quantification is existential and has pseudo-scope over OP. This is the only
possibility.
(19) a. (. . . [a NP]i . . . ) and ( . . . OP . . . iti . . . )
b. ∃x ∈ JNPK, (. . . xi . . . ) and ( . . . OP . . . x . . . )
In light of the discussion of section 2, we know that this result carries over to donkey
sentences, since the readings of the latter are constructed by the Extension Principle.
So (20) will be interpreted as either (20a) or (20b).
5 These labels are only meant as useful terms to describe readings; as such, they do not come with any
theoretical assumptions about the interpretation of pronouns.
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(20) Every farmer [that owns a donkey] [. . . OP . . . iti . . . ]
a. Every farmer [that owns a donkey] [∀x, (farmer owns x)→ . . . OP . . . x . . . ]
b. Every farmer [that owns a donkey] [∃x, (farmer owns x) ∧ . . . OP . . . x . . . ]
To recap, the Extension Principle predicts implicit quantification of the pronoun
to have the widest pseudo-scope in cross-clausal anaphora, as well as in donkey
sentences. Does this prediction hold? No, as it turns out. To my knowledge, Solomon
(2012) was the first to make the observation6,7. He considers the sentence in (21),
which contains the scope-bearing operator forget. He notices that the truth-conditions
of (21) are not quite those given by the wide-pseudo-scope paraphrase in (21a), since
these entail the existence of a specific quarter that each man was supposed to put
in the meter. Rather, it seems that the truth-conditions simply entail that each man
was supposed to put some quarter or other in the meter (cf (21b)). This is a narrow
pseudo-scope reading.
(21) At least one man who had a quarter forgot to put it in the meter.
a. At least one man who had a quarter is such that there is some quarter he
has that he forgot to put in the meter.
b. At least one man who had a quarter is such that he forgot to put some
quarter or other in the meter.
Other examples can be constructed with more mundane scope-bearing operators.
In each case, the paraphrase features an implicit quantification taking scope below
the boldfaced operator. For instance, (22) can be true even if a particular movie
aficionado uses different passes on different occasions and (23) when some father
used different chocolate bars for different children.
6 I thank Simon Charlow for this reference.
7 Solomon’s (2012)’s own solution to the problem is dynamic in nature. He proposes that the referent’s
introduction property of an indefinite may be delayed, up till the point of evaluation of the pronoun.
When such a delay is created, the pronoun’s implicit quantification has scope as low as the pronoun
and is necessarily existential. When no delay is created, the pronoun behaves according to the rules
set in section 2. In this system, the choice of delaying has to be made at the level of the indefinite,
since it is the indefinite which introduces the referents. As such, it will fail to predict mixed cases
where a single indefinite antecedes both a wide-pseudo-scope pronoun interpreted with universal
force and a low-pseudo-scope pronoun with universal force.
(i) Every citizen who has an ID keeps it in his wallet and shows it whenever she is asked to.
 keeps all of his IDs in his wallet.
 shows one of his IDs when she is asked.
Similar kind of counter-evidence will be discussed when discussing Brasoveanu 2008 in section 5.
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(22) Every citizen who has a movie pass1 uses it1 every chance he has.
 for every chance he has, he uses one of the movie passes he has.
(23) Every man who received a chocolate bar1 gave a piece of it1 to each of his
kids
 for every kid, he gave a piece of one of the chocolate bars he received.
The narrow pseudo-scope reading also obtains in the cross-clausal case, as is ex-
pected from section 2; one just needs to make sure to cancel the uniqueness implica-
ture by using a bet environment.
(24) I bet you $10 that Charles has a valid ID and that he shows it whenever he is
asked to.
(25) Outcome: Charles has two valid ID cards and shows one or the other when-
ever he is asked.  won!
Recap. In this section, I have shown that two predictions made by the Extension
Principle were not borne out. The first prediction was the absence of universal
readings for cross-clausal anaphora. The second prediction was the obligatory wide
pseudo-scope of the implicit quantifier. The immediate conclusion to draw is that
there’s something in the truth-conditions of anaphora anteceded by indefinites which
is not captured by standard dynamic systems.
Taking a step back, one can see another conclusion emerging from the discussion.
The presence of universal readings in cross-clausal anaphora suggests that the
existential/universal ambiguity exist across the board (as soon as the pronoun is
anteceded by an indefinite). It is thus independent of the donkey environment. As
for the existence of narrow pseudo-scope readings, it suggests that the ambiguity
is, in some sense, local to the pronoun. Whatever is responsible for creating the
implicit quantification can see the environment the pronoun is in. Putting these two
conclusions together suggests a different take on the truth-conditions of anaphora
anteceded by an indefinite and the existential/universal ambiguity: it is the pronoun
itself that is responsible for the ambiguity. In the next section, I’ll present an analysis
exploring that particular route. Specifically, I will claim that when there are multiple
referents that a pronoun can refer to, the pronoun has a vague interpretation. It is
this vagueness that is to blame for the ambiguity. Since the vagueness is generated
locally to the pronoun, it is able to generate narrow pseudo-scope readings.
4 Analysis
The idea that we want to capitalize on is that the ambiguity arises when speakers
are unable to select a unique referent for a particular pronoun; in such a situation,
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vagueness ensues, of a trivalent nature, following ideas from Champollion et al.
2017. As there are different ways this vagueness may be resolved in context, the
sentence consequently receives different readings, accounting for both the ambiguity
and the examples discussed in the previous section.
4.1 Basic E-type set-up
Before I am able to spell out this intuition, I will first need to take a stand on how a
pronoun accesses its antecedent. Here for simplicity, I will adopt the E-type approach
of Cooper 1979. At the end of the section, I will explain how much commitment
there really is to this choice, for anyone who embraces the vagueness approach
advocated here. In the approach of Cooper 1979, pronouns contain a covert structure
of the form in (26). In this structure, the index i denotes the individual g(i), that is
provided by the assignment function, R is a contextually salient relation, and the is
the definite article.
(26) iti = [the [R i]]
In standard donkey sentences, the E-type approach assumes that i is bound by the
quantifier “every farmer” and that R is resolved to the relation described in (27).
(27) Every farmer who owns a donkey treats iti(=the R i) well.
 R(x)(y) iff y is a donkey owned by x
(28) Reading: every donkey-owning farmer treats the donkey that he owns well
There is a known problem to this approach (Heim 1982): under a standard Fregean
analysis of the, the sentence should carry a uniqueness presupposition that every
farmer owns only one donkey. The fact that such uniqueness fails to hold in donkey
sentences is precisely why we come to be interested in the existential/universal
ambiguity in the first place.
In short, the problem with Cooper’s (1979)’s approach is that it imposes a strong
condition that we may uniquely identify the donkey that each farmer owns. The
general philosophy of my approach, stated in the introduction, is different in spirit
to the Fregean analysis: when donkeys may not be uniquely identified, vagueness
ensues, not infelicity. To clearly differentiate the vague definite article I propose
from the Fregean uniqueness definite article, I will refer to the former as dthe.
4.2 Vagueness
Vague pronouns. When a sentence like (29a) is evaluated in a world where Joey
own three donkeys Twix, Crunch, and Mars, we want to say that the hearer will be
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unsure whether it refers to Twix, Crunch or Mars. Formally, this will be implemented
by having it denote the set of all three individuals as in Alternative Semantics8 (cf
(29b)) .
(29) a. Joeyi owns a donkey and he treats it (= dthe R i) well
b. JitiK= {twix′,crunch′,mars′}
How is this result derived from the basic structure of the E-type pronoun? I submit
that dthe is itself the vague item in the structure of the pronoun. In the pronoun
structure, the constituent [R i] represents a set of possible referents. The item dthe
represents a way of choosing a referent. Since there are many ways of choosing a
referent in a set, dthe will have multiple outputs, yielding the desired vagueness.
This mechanism of choice is implemented using choice functions (Reinhart
1997); a choice function is a function from set of individuals to individuals in that
set. I assume that dthe denotes all such choice functions. This is the inherent
vagueness of dthe.
(30) JdtheK= { f | ∀E 6= /0, f (E) ∈ E}
The combination of dthe with the constituent [R i] is obtained with the rule of point-
wise functional application rule, given below. This rule is the standard replacement
of functional application in the context of Alternative Semantics.
Functional Application. If A is a node of type bc and
B a node of type b, then:
JA BKg,w = { f (x) | f ∈ JAKg,w, x ∈ JBKg,w}
Trivalent truth-conditions. Within this alternative semantics, the second conjunct
of (29a) receives multiple truth-values, depending on which referent for iti is chosen
to pursue the evaluation. A derivation of the second clause in (29a) is provided in
(31) assuming that Twix, Crunch and Mars are Joey’s donkeys. The net result of it,
given in (32), is the following: in a world where Joey treats Twix well, but not the
other donkeys, the sentence receives two truth-values: {true, false}. By convention,
we denote this set as #. In a world where he treats all of his donkeys well, the
sentence only receives the truth-value true; finally the sentence only receives the
truth-value false in a world where Joey treats all of his donkeys poorly.
(31) a. Jtreats it wellKg,w =
{λx. x treats Twix well in w,λx. x treats Crunch well in w,
λx. x treats Mars well in w}
8 See Kamp & Partee 1995 for another use of alternative semantics to deal with vagueness.
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b. Jtreats it wellKg,w =
{Joey treats Twix well in w,Joey treats Crunch well in w,
Joey treats Mars well in w}
(32) Jhe treats it wellKg,w =

true if Joey treats all of his donkeys well.
false if Joey treats none of his donkeys well.
# if Joey treats some but not all of his donkeys well.
This is the desired result: failure of uniqueness does not trigger infelicity as in
Cooper 1979 but vagueness. This vagueness may or may not result in uncertainty
about truth-values, depending on which world the sentence is evaluated in.
Resolving vagueness. Now, we will see how the truth/falsity-conditions above
translate into an existential/universal ambiguity. When the speaker expresses a
proposition which evaluates to # in certain worlds from the common ground9,
hearers need to decide whether these #-worlds are to be included in the new updated
context set or excluded from it. To put it differently, hearers have to give #-world
to an actual truth-value. This decision is pragmatic in nature and reflects hearer’s
expectations of what the speaker intended to express.
Whatever the pragmatic reasoning is that hearers follow, existential truth-
conditions are obtained when hearers uniformly assign true to #-worlds. Indeed,
from (32), this amounts to saying that the sentence is true just in case Joey treats
some but not all or all of his donkeys well; in other words, the negation of the falsity
conditions. Similarly, universal truth-conditions result from uniformly assigning
false to #-worlds. In a nutshell, cross-conjunction anaphora can get both existential
and universal readings.
Of course, a complete account needs to specify exactly what procedure hearers
follow and what conversational situations lead to one reading or the other. This ties
back to the problem mentioned in the introduction of deriving the default readings
of donkey sentences. Champollion et al. (2017), using ideas from Križ 2016,
provide such a procedure. Their procedure relies on the question under discussion to
recover the missing truth-values. In default contexts, the question under discussion
is assumed to be maximally fine-grained and the resulting reading the strongest
reading possible. To account for some, whose default reading is existential, and
therefore the weakest reading possible, they adopt the proposal by Geurts (2002)
that intersective quantifiers can be evaluated against sub-models, effectively turning
universal readings into existential ones.
I have nothing to add to this proposal, which can be adapted wholesale to the
current system. However, since my goal is to design a system that generates all
9 I assume the reader is familiar with the Stalnakerian model of conversation, where propositions are
used to update the common ground, i.e. the set of shared beliefs.
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observed interpretations of donkey sentences and not to derive reading preferences, I
will set the gap resolution procedure aside in the rest of this article.
Donkey sentences. To deal with donkey sentences and make the pseudo-scope
predictions, it is necessary to specify how vagueness interacts with λ -abstraction.
Fortunately, there is a ready-made rule in the alternative semantics literature rule that
happens to fit our needs. It is defined in Kratzer & Shimoyama 2017. The rule states
that one forms a set of predicate denotations from a set of proposition denotations
containing an unbound variable x, by taking all the different ways of mapping x to
an element of the alternative proposition set.
λ -abstraction rule. If A is a constituent of type t, thenJλi AKg,w = { f ∈ Det | ∀x, f (x) ∈ JAKg,w}
As an example, we’ll derive the truth-falsity conditions of the simple donkey sentence
in (33). Let’s assume that the context provides the value “λx.λy. y is a donkey owned
by x” for R. The derivation is given in (33).
(33) Every farmer who owns a donkey λ1 t1 treats it(=dthe R i) well.
(34) a. The interpretation of the pronoun is the set of all donkeys owned by a given
farmer
Jthe R 1Kg[1→x] = JtheK(JR 1Kg[1→x])
= {y is a donkey owned by x | y ∈ De}=: Donk(x)
b. The nuclear scope receives the same trivalent truth-conditions as in the
cross-conjunction example.
Jt1 treats it wellKg[1→x] = Jtreats-wellKg[1→x](JitKg[1→x])(Jt1Kg[1→x])
= {x treats y well | y ∈ Donk(x)}
=

true if for all y in Donk(x), x treats y well
false if for no y in Donk(x), x treats y well
# otherwise
c. Abstracting over index 1 following the abstraction rule given above.
Jλ1 t1 treats it wellKg = { f ∈ Det ∣∣∣ ∀x, f (x) ∈ Jt1 treats it wellKg[1→x]}
=
{
f
∣∣∣∣ f (x) = true if x treats well all y in Donk(x)and f (x) = false if x treats well no y in Donk(x)
}
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d. Finally, the quantifier combines with this alternative predicate:J(33)Kg = Jevery farmer . . . K(Jλ1 t1 treats it wellKg)
=
{
f ∈ Det
∣∣∣ ∀x, f (x) ∈ Jt1 treats it wellKg[1→x]}
=

true if every farmer x who [...] treats well every y in Donk(x)
false if some farmer x who [...] treats well no y in Donk(x)
# otherwise
Just as with the cross-conjunction case, the existential and universal reading corre-
spond to two different assignment of truth-values to #-worlds. When all the #-worlds
are assigned to false, the only worlds that are true are those that were initially true;
by (34d), this corresponds to the reading “every farmer x who owns a donkey treats
well every y in Donk(x)”. This is the universal reading. When all the #-worlds
are assigned to false, all the worlds that were initially not false (i.e. true or #) are
treated as true. The resulting reading is the negation of the falsity conditions: “not
some farmer x who owns a donkey treats well no y in Donk(x)”, i.e. “every farmer x
who owns a donkey treats well some y in Donk(x)”. In other words, the existential
reading.
Narrow pseudo-scope. Our predictions diverge from that of classical dynamic
semantics in exactly the problematic cases. Since the vagueness stems from the
pronoun, any operator that the pronoun is in the scope of may affect the truth-falsity
condition, yielding the observed narrow pseudo-scope. Consider (35). I derive the
predicted truth-conditions, focusing on the important steps.
(35) Every citizen who has a valid ID λ1 t1 shows it (=dthe R 1) whenever she1 is
asked to.
(36) a. Assume that whenever is a universal quantifier over a time domain AJwhenever she1 is asked toKg,τ0 = λτt .∀t ∈ A, p(t)
b. Following the same steps as above:
Jt1 shows itKg[1→x],t =

true if x shows all y in ID(x) at t
false if x shows no y in ID(x) at t
# otherwise
c. The vagueness projects out of the whenever quantification similar to (34d)Jt1 shows it whenever . . . Kg[1→x],τ0 = true if for all t in A, x beat all y in ID(x) at tfalse if for some t in A, x beat no y in ID(x) at t# otherwise
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d. Likewise, we derive the matrix level truth/falsity conditions.
J(35)Kg[1→x],τ0 =

true if for all ID-owning citizen x, for all t in A,
for all y in ID(x), x shows y at t
false if for some ID-owning citizen x, for some t in A,
for no y in ID(x), x shows y at t
# otherwise
Let us unpack the predictions. As with donkey sentences, existential truth-conditions
are obtained when all the #s are resolved to false. So the truth-conditions of the
existential reading can be obtained by simply negating the falsity conditions of the
sentence. This gives the narrow pseudo-scope existential reading in (37).
(37) (35) is true under the existential reading iff every ID-owning citizen showed
some ID or other every time she was asked
4.3 Recap
In this section, we spelled out the idea that pronouns are responsible for the exis-
tential/universal ambiguity. We assumed that when a pronoun’s antecedent spans
multiple referents, the pronoun is itself ambiguous between these referents. We
gave two standard rules of Alternative Semantics governing the way vagueness of
reference projects at the level of the sentence. The resulting truth/falsity conditions
were shown to result in existential/universal ambiguity for simple donkey sentences.
The analysis went further than that and derived existential/universal ambiguity for
cross-conjunction anaphora and narrow pseudo-scope readings, the two problematic
cases of section 3.
What is crucial to this approach is the vagueness and the rules of projection
thereof. As for the E-type component, its contribution can be summed up as follows:
it provides the pool of referents (e.g. the donkeys owned by Camelia) which dthe
can then choose from. One could therefore imagine to replace the E-type part of the
analysis by a dynamic system where the set of all donkeys owned by Camelia would
all be stored in an index10. In this system, the pronoun would choose a referent
from this index in much the same way as dthe chose from the individuals provided
by the descriptive content of the pronoun. If such a system were to be adopted,
the predictions would be identical and the intuitions behind the system would be
preserved.
10 This is reminiscent of the system in Solomon 2012 (see fn. 7). Two majour differences are that the
choice of the pronoun’s implicit quantification need not be made at the level of the indefinite and the
vagueness mechanics.
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5 Previous approaches
In this section, I review two approaches to the existential/universal amiguity and
compare them to my own: Champollion et al. 2017, the inspiration of this work, and
Brasoveanu 2008, which also discusses narrow pseudo-scope readings.
PCDRT. In a series of works (Brasoveanu 2007, 2008; Brasoveanu & Farkas
2011), Brasoveanu develops the Plural Compositional DRT framework, which relies
on the plural assignments conceived by van den Berg 1996. He shows that this
innovation can be used to account for an impressive range of discourse phenomena.
Of particular interest to us is his treatment of the existential/universal ambiguity.
His proposal is to distinguish between a weak and a strong indefinite; the former is
responsible for existential readings and the latter for universal readings. As noted by
Champollion et al. (2017), this predicts that a single indefinite may not antecede both
an existentially interpreted pronoun and a universally interpreted pronoun. This is
not borne out as the example from Champollion et al. 2017, repeated in (38), shows.
(38) Every man who has an umbrella takes it along on rainy days but leaves it
home on sunny days.
 takes one of his umbrellas . . . leaves all of his umbrellas
In addition to this, the present work provides different challenges to the system in
Brasoveanu 2008. In spite of the adoption of plural assignments, the system cannot
generate universal cross-conjunction readings and narrow pseudo-scope readings.
Regarding the former, PCDRT allows for two structures depending on whether the
indefinite is weak or strong. These two structures yield an existential reading and a
uniqueness reading11 respectively. The universal reading described in section 3 is
missing.
(39) Camelia has aweak donkey/astrong donkey. She treats it well.
a. Weak reading: There is a donkey that Camelia owns and that she treats
well.
b. Strong reading: Camelia has exactly one donkey and she treats it well.
The narrow pseudo-scope reading is not predicted either. PCDRT only predicts a
wide pseudo-scope universal or existential reading. This omission from the system is
intentional; indeed, in a discussion of number-neutral theories of donkey anaphora,
Brasoveanu (2008) gives the example in (40), which at first blush suggests the
absence of such readings.
11 Interestingly, the uniqueness reading is obtained as a combination of the strong indefinite and the
singular feature on the anaphora. In principle thus, and assuming that plural features are semantically
vacuous, such sentences as “*Camelia has astrong donkey and she treats them well” should be fine.
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(40) Every man who brought a friend to the party introduced him to every movie
star there.
6 . . . is such that he introduced each movie star to a (possibly different)
friend.
(40) does not seem to be compatible with any friend not being presented to every
movie star, as the narrow pseudo-scope existential reading would have it. This seems
to go against the evidence presented here and in Solomon 2012 for the existence of
such readings.
Here is a speculation as to the origin of this discrepancy: for a narrow pseudo-
scope reading to be available in my system, the operator (here, every movie star)
has to take scope above the pronoun at LF. Scoping is not free and is subject to
constraints, such as Scope Economy (Fox 1995), which prevents a scoping operation
from being vacuous. For Scope Economy to have detectable effects, the notion of
semantically vacuous moves needs to be defined in a rather narrow way, so that
indirect effects, like scope parallelism in ellipsis, may nonetheless be observed.
Following this lead, it is conceivable that scoping over a pronoun as in (40) counts
as a semantically vacuous move. As preliminary evidence for this view, consider the
example I used to illustrate the narrow pseudo-scope readings, repeated below in
(41). This example is structurally similar to that in (40), except that the pronoun is
itself embedded in an indefinite (a piece of ). Introducing a semantically contentful
quantifier around the pronoun seems enough to trigger scoping of each above it, thus
generating the narrow pseudo-scope reading.
(41) Every man who received a chocolate bar1 gave [a piece of it1] to each of his
kids.
Champollion et al. 2017. The trivalent treatment of vagueness in the present paper
is adapted from an original idea of Champollion et al. (2017). The main difference
between my approach and theirs concerns the origin of the vagueness. In their
approach, it is the type-shifter that turns a static quantifier into a dynamic quantifier
that introduces the vagueness; the pronoun does not participate in its creation.
The type-shifter they propose is constructed from the two procedures for creating
dynamic quantifiers that I presented in section 2, repeated below in (43). In its
type-shifted meaning, every is true just in case both the existential reading of every
- as generated by the denotation in (43a) - and the universal reading of every - as
generated by the denotation in (43b) - are true, false when both are false, # otherwise.
The italicized bits in the last sentence are the important ones. We already know
the shortcomings of the denotations in (43): they only generate wide pseudo-scope
readings. Consequently, so does the type shifter in (42).
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(42) J↑ every α β K=

true if Jeveryuni α β K= true and Jeveryex α β K=true
false if Jeveryuni α β K= false and Jeveryex α β K= false
# otherwise
(43) a. Jeveryex α β K= ∀x ∈ JαK, ¬(JαK(x)∧¬Jβ K(x))
b. Jeveryuni α β K= ∀x ∈ JαK, JαK(x)∧ Jβ K(x)
To see this more clearly, consider once more the sentence in (41). Also consider
a context where nine men received just one chocolate bar and gave a piece of that
chocolate bar to all their kids. Finally, one man received two chocolate bars and
used one chocolate bar for half his kids and the other for the other half. The sentence
(41) is judged true in this context. By contrast, the type-shifter in (42) predicts it to
be false: since the kids of the last man do not get a piece from all chocolate bars, the
universal wide pseudo-scope reading in (43b) is false; since not all kids get a piece
from the same chocolate bar, the existential narrow pseudo-scope reading in (43a) is
false. In conclusion, the type-shifter proposed by Champollion et al. (2017) does not
predict the narrow pseudo-scope readings, and this independently of the adoption of
trivalence.
6 Conclusion
In the introduction, I presented three challenges posed by pronouns anteceded by
indefinites: how referents are accessed by those pronouns, what truth-conditions
they give rise to, and what pragmatic factors affect these truth-conditions. This
paper contributed to the second challenge by presenting two readings that were not
generated by previous accounts: universal cross-conjunction readings and narrow
pseudo-scope readings. To account for these readings, I proposed that pronouns have
vague reference. Supplemented with only standard rules of Alternative Semantics,
the system was able to derive the missing readings.
While this account is sufficient to capture the facts presented here, it is incomplete
insofar as it does not take a stance on the other two challenges. For instance, the
analysis completely lacks a theory of the pragmatics of the ambiguity, i.e. the reading
preferences observed by Kanazawa (1994) and their relative strength. In the view
developed here, such preferences would have to be derived from the pragmatics of
trivalence. How this can be done is a question left open to future research.
Another question left open here is the question of whether a wide pseudo-scope
reading is ever available, when the operator is clearly scoping above the pronoun (cf
discussion of (40)). The analysis here predicts this to be impossible. While I do not
have unambiguous evidence of this, I suspect it is possible. If it is, adaptations to the
current system of vagueness projection would need to be made.
194
Gaps in the interpretation of pronouns
References
van den Berg, Martin. 1996. Dynamic generalized quantifiers. In Jaap van der
Does & Jan van Eijck (eds.), Quantifiers, logic and language, 63–94. Stanford
University.
Brasoveanu, Adrian. 2007. Structured nominal and modal reference. New Jersey:
Rutgers University PhD dissertation. doi:10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004.
Brasoveanu, Adrian. 2008. Donkey pluralities: Plural information states ver-
sus non-atomic individuals. Linguistics and Philosophy 31(2). 129–209.
doi:10.1007/s10988-008-9035-0.
Brasoveanu, Adrian & Donka Farkas. 2011. How indefinites choose their scope.
Linguistics and Philosophy 34(1). 1–55. doi:10.1007/s10988-011-9092-7.
Champollion, Lucas, Dylan Bumford & Robert Henderson. 2017. Donkeys under
discussion. Semantics and Pragmatics (to appear).
Chierchia, Gennaro. 1995. Dynamics of meaning. University of Chicago Press.
doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226104515.001.0001.
Cooper, Robin. 1979. The interpretation of pronouns. Syntax and Semantics 10.
61–92.
Foppolo, Francesca. 2008. The puzzle of donkey anaphora resolution. In Anisa
Schardl, Martin Walkow & Muhammad Abdurrahman (eds.), North east linguis-
tics society (NELS), vol. 38, 297–310. GLSA.
Fox, Danny. 1995. Economy and scope. Natural Language Semantics 3(3). 283–341.
doi:10.1007/BF01248820.
Geach, Peter Thomas. 1964. Reference and generality. Cornell University Press.
Geurts, Bart. 2002. Donkey business. Linguistics and Philosophy 25(2). 129–156.
Groenendijk, Jeroen & Martin Stokhof. 1991. Dynamic predicate logic. Linguistics
and Philosophy 14(1). 39–100. doi:10.1007/BF00628304.
Heim, Irene. 1982. The semantics of definite and indefinite noun phrases. Amherst,
MA: University of Massachusetts, Amherst PhD dissertation.
Kamp, Hans & Barbara Partee. 1995. Prototype theory and compositionality.
Cognition 57(2). 129–191.
Kanazawa, Makoto. 1994. Weak vs. strong readings of donkey sentences and
monotonicity inference in a dynamic setting. Linguistics and Philosophy 17(2).
109–158. doi:10.1007/BF00984775.
Kratzer, Angelika & Junko Shimoyama. 2017. Indeterminate pronouns: The view
from japanese. In Contrastiveness in information structure, alternatives and
scalar implicatures, 123–143. Springer.
Križ, Manuel. 2016. Homogeneity, non-maximality, and all. Journal of Semantics
33(3). 493–539. doi:10.1093/jos/ffv006.
Muskens, Reinhard. 1996. Combining montague semantics and discourse represen-
195
Chatain
tation. Linguistics and Philosophy 19(2). 143–186. doi:10.1007/BF00635836.
Reinhart, Tanya. 1997. Quantifier scope: How labor is divided between qr and
choice functions. Linguistics and Philosophy 20(4). 335–397.
Root, Rebecca Louise. 1986. The semantics of anaphora in discourse. Austin,
Texas: University of Austin, Texas PhD dissertation.
Rooth, Mats. 1985. Association with focus. Amherst, Massachusetts: University of
Massachusetts, Amherst PhD dissertation.
Schlenker, Philippe. 2012. The semantics/pragmatics interface. In Cambridge
handbook of semantics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Solomon, Mike. 2012. Donkey readings and delayed quantification. New York:
New York University MA thesis.
Keny Chatain
MIT Linguistics and Philosophy
32 Vassar Street 32-D806
MA02139 Cambridge
keny.chatain@gmail.com
196
